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‘Coordination’ (Herbert H Clark), ‘integration’ (Roy Harris) and the foundations 
of communication theory: common ground or competing visions? 
 
‘Language use is really a form of joint action. A joint action is one that is carried out 
by an ensemble of people acting in coordination with each other’ (Clark, 1996: 3). 
 
 ‘If we wish to communicate with others, by whatever means, we have to find ways of 
integrating (albeit partially and temporarily) our activities with theirs and theirs with 
ours’ (Harris, 1996: 14). 
 
 
For Roy Harris1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper explores the relationship between Herbert H Clark’s conception of 
language use as ‘coordination’ in joint action and Roy Harris’s view of sign-making 
as an ‘integration’ of activities.  
 
On the face of it, the two approaches have much in common.  Both Clark and Harris 
have raised fundamental objections to traditional linguistic approaches:  Clark has 
counterposed an 'action tradition' to a prevailing 'product tradition', while Harris has 
proposed an 'integrational' view in opposition to a prevailing 'segregational' 
approach, both scholars insisting on seeing the production and interpretation of signs 
as embedded in contexts of activity. However, clear differences between the two 
approaches revolve around their respective attitudes to common ground in joint 
action and to the existence of languages as conventionally theorised. The paper 
explores these differences in relation to the role of intention and shared knowledge in 
meaning-making and to the status of conventional meaning in linguistic 
communication. The paper argues that Clark's approach overall ultimately proves 
vulnerable to Harris's critique of the reifying tendencies and ideology of the western 
language tradition and ends with a brief reflection on the wider socio-political 
implications of debates over linguistic methodology.  
 
Keywords: coordination, integrationism, language use, common ground, sign-
making, conventional meaning 
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
The current focus on language as situated, real-time interaction (‘languaging’ in 
fashionable parlance)2 marks a significant break from the 20th century linguistic 
                                                          
1
 Roy Harris passed away on February 9
th
 2015 as I was preparing this paper for publication.  
2
 The teƌŵ ͚laŶguagiŶg͛ is due to Huŵďeƌto MatuƌaŶa ;ϭϵϴϴͿ ǁhose oǁŶ iŶflueŶĐe oŶ eŵeƌgiŶg tƌeŶds iŶ the 
language sciences is now considerable and still growing (see Kravchenko, 2011, for a cogent summary of 
MatuƌaŶa͛s positioŶ aŶd its ƌeleǀaŶĐe foƌ liŶguistiĐ theoƌǇͿ. I ĐaŶ fiŶd Ŷo ƌefeƌeŶĐe to the pioŶeeƌiŶg ǁoƌk of 
Maturana (1970, 1978) in Clark or Harris. However, the conceptual affinities which some scholars find between 
MatuƌaŶa͛s ďiologiĐallǇ ďased appƌoaĐh aŶd Haƌƌis͛s iŶtegƌatioŶal seŵiologǇ ǁould ŵake a ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of the 
views of these two scholars both interesting and timely. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for 
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orthodoxy built on ‘languages’ conceived as systems of invariant form-meaning units 
underlying actual instances of language use. But what kind of theory of 
communication – what kind of semiology – is required to do justice to the 
interactional dynamism and creativity of ‘languaging’ practices that research has 
begun to reveal? Amongst the many current attempts to address this fundamental 
re-orientation3, I wish to consider here two approaches with substantial claims on 
this new theoretical territory: the coordination approach of Herbert H Clark and the 
integrational semiology of Roy Harris.4  
 
1. Herbert H Clark and Roy Harris 
 
The two eminent principals of my discussion, Herbert H Clark and Roy Harris, have 
provided us with a remarkable fund of ground-breaking contributions to the study of 
language and communication.5 Both have proposed radical perspectives on the 
relationship between communication and social action under the influence of 
scholars, in particular Wittgenstein, Austin and Goffman, who have emphasised the 
instrumentality of language and the role of context in communicative 
interaction.There is also, on the face of it, a degree of convergence between their 
respective theoretical positions as set out in their most important works, (Harris, 
1996; Clark, 1996), coincidentally published in the same year. And yet, there is, to 
my knowledge, no history of intellectual engagement between Clark and Harris 
personally nor, as yet, much in the way of dialogue between advocates of their 
respective positions. Here, then, I take the opportunity to make an initial and 
undoubtedly superficial comparison of their views, shaped, inevitably, by my own 
integrationist leanings. I hope, therefore, that my view of Harris’s view of Clark may 
be followed by someone else’s view of Clark’s view of Harris. 
 
 
H H Clark 
 
Herbert H Clark is currently Professor of Psychology at Stanford University. He has 
published on a broad spectrum of topics in communication theory, linguistics, 
discourse analysis and the psychology of language since the 1970s. In particular, he 
has helped to shift analytical interest and attention towards the dynamic social-
interactional and socio-cognitive processes involved in linguistic and non linguistic 
communication (or ‘signaling’). In his most important single work, Using Language 
(1996), the key concepts of ‘joint action’, ‘common ground’ and ‘coordination’ are 
explored in detail for their relevance to our understanding of signaling generally and 
language use more particularly. One of the most important aspects of Clark’s work is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aďout the teƌŵ ͚laŶguagiŶg͛ aŶd foƌ dƌaǁiŶg ŵǇ atteŶtioŶ to the ƌelevance and significance of 
MatuƌaŶa͛s ǁoƌk aŶd its ƌelatioŶship to that of Haƌƌis. See also SteffeŶseŶ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ foƌ disĐussioŶ of MatuƌaŶa 
fƌoŵ the peƌspeĐtiǀe of the ͚Distƌiďuted LaŶguage AppƌoaĐh͛.  
3
 See, for example, Kravchenko (2003), Hodges and Fowler (2010). 
4
 I ǁill Ŷot atteŵpt heƌe to disĐuss possiďle diffeƌeŶĐes ďetǁeeŶ HaƌƌisiaŶ iŶtegƌatioŶisŵ aŶd the ͚distƌiďuted 
laŶguage͛ ǀieǁ ;CoǁleǇ, ϮϬϬϳ, 2011; Thibault, 2011; Steffensen, 2015) developed partially under the influence 
of Harris. For a recent ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of ͚iŶtegƌatoƌs͛ aŶd ͚distƌiďutoƌs͛, see OƌŵaŶ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
5
 Foƌ Claƌk͛s ǁoƌk see the Wikipedia site ;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_H._Clark) and  
 Claƌk͛s oǁŶ ǁeďsite ;http://web.stanford.edu/~clark/. Foƌ Haƌƌis͛s ǁoƌk see the Wikipedia site  
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roy_Harris_%28linguist%29) and the website of the International Association for 
the Integrational Study of Language and Communication (http://www.integrationists.com). 
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that it attempts a unification of the study of language and communication with the 
study of social activity via the principle of coordination of individual acts into joint 
actions. While undoubtedly part of what one might loosely call the mainstream in the 
language sciences these days, Clark's critical relationship to key assumptions in 
orthodox linguistic theory puts him at the radical cutting edge of that mainstream in 
some respects, as evidenced by the use of his framework in recent research on the 
synchronisation and coupling of bodily processes in communicative interaction (e.g., 
Richardson, Dale and Tomlinson, 2009; Shockley, Richardson and Dale, 2009; Dale, 
Kirkham and Richardson, 2011).   
 
 
Roy Harris 
 
Roy Harris was Emeritus Professor of General Linguistics at the University of Oxford 
and the author of a substantial body of provocative writings on all aspects of 
communication and language (spoken and written). ‘Integrationism’, ‘integrational 
semiology’ or ‘integrationist linguistics’ are the terms applied to a current of critical 
linguistic thinking formulated by Harris and developed initially in collaboration with 
students and former students and subsequently by a wider scholarly circle (see, for 
example, Love, 2011; Pablé and Hutton, 2015). The term ‘integrational’ is designed 
to emphasise the inseparability of sign-making practices and their products from 
purposeful human activity as against the ‘segregationist’ view of language as a self-
contained system. The rationale for integrationism was elaborated in Harris's early 
books, notably (1980) (The Language Makers) and (1981) (The Language Myth) via 
a root and branch critique of western philosophy of language and linguistic theory 
and advanced perhaps most cogently in his Signs, Language and Communication 
(1996). In contrast with Clark, Harris was an anti-establishment figure and remained 
outside the linguistic mainstream although his innovations are attracting increasing 
attention from many scholars seeking to theorise the interactional or ‘distributed’ 
processes of linguistic and nonlinguistic communication in real life contexts (cf., 
Cowley, 2011; Cowley and Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Thibault, 2011; Orman, 2015; 
Steffensen, 2015). 
 
2. Points of convergence 
 
1. The language of real life 
 
In his 'Dogmas of understanding' (1997), Clark casts a wry and critical eye on what 
he calls 'the science we are pursuing' which, to outsiders, 'must look very odd 
indeed' (1997: 594). 'It doesn't seem to be about people of flesh and blood', he goes 
on, 'but about beings unanchored to any situation, without faces, eyes or hands for 
gesturing, without the ability to pretend, tease, or play. It seems to be about 
language in a vacuum' (1997: 594). The intellectual root of the problem for Clark lies 
in what he calls the ‘product tradition’ in linguistics, in which ‘sentences, words, and 
phonetic segments are treated as linguistic types abstracted away from speakers, 
times, places, and circumstances in which they might have been produced’ (1996: 
56).6 As an alternative, he advocates an ‘action tradition’ in which ‘the focus from the 
beginning has been on what people do with language’ (1996: 57-8), that is on 
                                                          
6
 For a thorough integrationist critique of the type-token relationship in linguistic theory, see Hutton (1990). 
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‘language use’. Language use, for Clark, is a form of ‘joint action’ which is ‘one that 
is carried out by an ensemble of people acting in coordination with each other’ (1996: 
3). 
 
Harris, similarly, has repeatedly attacked ‘the dehumanisation of language’ which 
comes from the ‘segregationist’ practice of ‘treating the linguistic system as an 
independent abstraction’ (2012: 116): 'Episodes of communication are episodes in 
the lives of particular people at particular times and places', he argues (Harris, 2009: 
70). Thus, integrationism rejects in principle ‘[a]ny initial academic strategy which, for 
theoretical purposes, treats communicational processes or communicational systems 
as segregated, self-contained structures, and assumes that each must be analyzed 
exclusively “in its own terms", without any reference whatsoever to neighbouring 
processes or systems' (1996: 17-18).  
 
Both scholars agree, then, in arguing for a conception of language which is radically 
non autonomous in social or psychological terms.  As Clark argues: ‘Language 
fundamentally is used for social purposes ... Languages as we know them wouldn’t 
exist if it weren’t for the social activities they are instrumental in’ (Clark, 1996: 23). 
Similarly, Harris: ‘Language is an activity which would be meaningless unless the 
language-users also engaged in other forms of social interaction’ (1998b: 6). 
 
2. Signs of activity: coordination and integration 
 
Both Clark and Harris have, quite independently, placed notions of action and activity 
at the heart of their theoretical innovations.7 While Clark draws most directly and 
explicitly on the conceptions of coordination and convention in the work of Lewis 
(1969) and Schelling (1960), Harris has developed his unique theoretical position 
partly by synthesising the timid and unsystematic threads of linguistic contextualism 
in the work of Sapir, Malinowski and Firth as well as Wittgenstein8 and Austin. 
  
For Clark, ‘[l]anguage arises when people try to do things with each other in joint 
activities' (2005: 507). Furthermore, '[i]t takes coordination for people to do things 
together, no matter how simple, and it takes communication to achieve that 
coordination’ (2005: 507). For Clark, communication has to do with the signifying 
acts (‘signals’) whereby people solve 'coordination problems' by coordinating their 
individual acts within a joint action. Drawing on Levinson’s concept of ‘activity types’ 
(Levinson, 1992; see Clark 1996: 30ff), Clark argues that joint activities (involving 
more than one participant) are constructed and advanced through ‘joint actions’ 
(1996: 59ff). A sales encounter, for example, may proceed via ‘opening the 
transaction, settling on the items wanted, establishing the price, exchanging money, 
and closing’ (1996: 30). Joint actions and their sequencing require coordination of 
the behaviours of customer and server via a variety of simultaneous and 
intermeshing signals of various kinds (conventional and nonconventional) adapted to 
the circumstances of the activity and the progress made towards the goal.9 From this 
                                                          
7
 See Jones (2011) for discussion of the notion of activity in integrationist work. 
8
 Foƌ Haƌƌis͛s ĐƌitiĐal ƌelatioŶship to WittgeŶsteiŶ see Haƌƌis ;ϭϵϴϴͿ.  
9
 Claƌk distiŶguishes ďetǁeeŶ ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ of ͚ĐoŶteŶt͛ ;͚ǁhat the paƌtiĐipaŶts iŶteŶd to do͛Ϳ aŶd ͚pƌoĐesses͛ 
;͚the phǇsiĐal aŶd ŵeŶtal sǇsteŵs theǇ ƌeĐƌuit iŶ ĐaƌƌǇiŶg out those iŶteŶtioŶs͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϯϬͿ. SuĐh a distiŶĐtioŶ, 
ĐƌuĐiallǇ iŶǀolǀiŶg ͚iŶteŶtioŶ͛ aŶd paƌalleliŶg the faŵiliaƌ ͚foƌŵ͛-͚ĐoŶteŶt͛ distiŶĐtioŶ iŶ ŵodeƌŶ liŶguistiĐs 
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point of view, signals serve as means to advance a ‘joint project’  - ‘a joint action 
projected by one of its participants and taken up by the others’ (Clark, 1996: 191). 
Since utterances will also be taken to ‘project a joint task’ (1996: 191), Clark is also 
able to present an interesting critique of Conversation Analysis (Sacks, 1992) and its 
invocation of rules of turn-taking (Clark, 1996, Chapter 7).10 Clark is able to re-work 
this treatment by re-interpreting conversation in terms of the differential contributions 
of participants to projected ‘joint projects’, thereby unifying the study of linguistic and 
non-linguistic signalling within a more general theory of communicative coordination. 
 
For Harris, communication can be treated ‘as including all processes in which human 
activities are contextually integrated by means of signs' (1996: 11), a definition which 
would cover all Clark’s cases of coordination. Thus, communication minimally 
depends on an ‘integration of two sequences of activity, the second of which 
complements the first’ (1996: 71), where complementation ‘requires that the second 
contribute to that sequence of events which the first is interpreted as projecting’ 
(1996: 70). Activities ‘may be said to be integrated when in combination they 
produce results which could not have been achieved by any of those single activities 
independently’ (1996); ‘[i]nterpersonal communication’ would therefore involve ‘the 
integration of activities between individuals' (1996). However, Harris would not 
accept the Gricean distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘non natural’ (or ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’) meaning upon which Clark bases his own distinction between ‘signals’ and 
‘symptoms’ (Clark, 1996: 126f; Harris, 1996: 53-58). Though Harris acknowledges 
the semiological relevance of a difference between interpreting one’s own 
observations and responding to a communicational initiative on the part of someone 
else (1996: 58), Harris would see the signs involved in both cases as products of the 
creative sign-making proficiency of the relevant individuals, hence equally ‘non 
natural’.   
 
From their ostensibly convergent positions, both scholars have rejected the strict 
demarcation, central to modern linguistics, between language and non linguistic 
signs (or verbal and non verbal communication), emphasising the need for a broader 
conception of language use which can capture the creative semiological synergies 
achieved by participants in context. As Clark argues: ‘Nods, smiles, gestures – these 
are all necessary to understanding ordinary linguistic communication ... No account 
of language use can be complete without these signals, the linguistic and 
nonlinguistic together’ (1996: 392). More radically still, Clark's work on 'material 
signals' (2005) shows how people simply invent signals by pressing features of the 
ambient environment of interaction (including their own bodies) into communicative 
service, often in sequence with or alongside verbal acts.  
 
Clark clarifies his own approach by making a distinction between ‘signals’ and 
‘methods of signaling’ (1996: 156). Saying ‘yes’ while nodding one’s head does not 
involve two signals - a linguistic signal (the word ‘yes’) plus a non linguistic signal 
(the head nod) – but a single ‘composite signal’ which defies classification as one or 
the other. Such composite signals for Clark represent ‘the artful fusion of two or more 
methods of signaling’, his three methods of signaling being ‘describing-as’, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
would be problematic for Harris (e.g., Haƌƌis, ϭϵϴϬ: ϭϱϱ oŶ ͚ďi-plaŶaƌitǇ͛Ϳ. OŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶal ͚ĐoŶteŶt͛ 
generally, see Harris (1996: Chapter 14). 
10
 For an integrationist critique of Conversation Analysis see Taylor and Cameron (1987). 
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‘indicating’, and ‘demonstrating’ (Clark, 1996: 391). These three methods can be 
related, he argues, to the Peircian classification of signs. Thus ‘describing as a type 
of thing’ gives us Peirce’s ‘symbol’, demonstrating a thing gives us the ‘icon’ and 
indicating a thing gives us the ‘index’ (1996: 160). While orthodox linguistics (what he 
refers to as ‘the standard picture’, 1996: 183) has focussed almost exclusively on 
‘describing-as’ (hence, the ‘symbol’), for ‘a realistic picture of language use, we must 
characterize the three processes and their integration’ (1996: 183).  
 
Harris, similarly, has emphasised 'the deployment of countless ad hoc 
communicational strategies, both verbal and non-verbal' in everyday life (1996: 263). 
As he argues: 
 
‘What we typically experience in face-to-face communication is the temporal 
development of a single integrated continuum, to which signs of various kinds 
contribute’ (1996: 105).  
 
However, while Harris has discussed the ‘basic integrational techniques’ (such as 
are involved in the integrated acts of exhibiting and inspecting of shopkeeper and 
customer, 1996: 65) based on common sensory modality11, he rejects any attempt, 
including the Peircian, to identify ‘types of sign’ (icon, index, symbol) or types of 
‘meaning’ (e.g., iconicity) independent of the communicative situation (1996: Chapter 
9). For Harris, signs are always made by the participants and that sign-making is the 
exercise by individuals of their ‘communicational proficiency’ (1998c: 44) (later, 
‘integrational proficiency’), that is, their powers, developed throughout their lives, of 
adapting their whole behaviour to exploit the communicational possibilities or 
exigencies (as they see it) of particular situations.  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of ‘non linguistic’ behaviours within the study of language 
use has more profound implications. Utterances, such as ‘Which finger did you cut?’ 
or ‘Two tickets please’ (Clark, 1996: 201) ‘often yield non-linguistic responses’ (e.g., 
showing the affected finger or handing over two tickets). Thus, in Clark’s re-working 
of the Conversation Analysis notion of ‘adjacency pair’ (or ‘paired action sequence’), 
the actions paired may just as well be non verbal. Similarly, for Harris, verbal and 
non verbal acts ‘have to be seen as integrated constituents in an interactive 
continuum of communication’ (2003: 44). If A asks B to ‘open the door’ and B opens 
it, then B ‘makes a linguistically appropriate contextual response to A’s utterance’ 
which in turn implies ‘that B’s actions also are signs, on an equal footing with the 
signs expressed vocally by A’ (2003: 44). For both scholars, then, language use 
(even, if you like, ‘English’) in such contexts extends to the complete interaction 
(Clark’s ‘joint project’). This state of affairs is explicitly articulated by Harris as the 
‘non compartmentalization’ principle (1981: 165) which, as he puts it, takes on board 
‘Sapir’s observation that ‘communication is based on structural correspondences 
between certain forms of behaviour in a situational context’ (1998b: 13), whatever 
those forms of behaviour are (‘linguistic’ or ‘non linguistic’).  
  
On this basis, both scholars argue that the traditional concept of ‘language’ is 
inadequate to capture the experience of live communication. For Clark, the 
‘“language” of language use, languageu, is ... not the same as the “language” of 
                                                          
11
 See Claƌk͛s ŵoƌe detailed tƌeatŵeŶt of ͚eǆhiďitioŶ͛ as oŶe tǇpe of ͚ŵateƌial sigŶal͛ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ. 
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language structure, languages’ in the sense of 'the symbols of a language like 
Japanese, Dakota, or American Sign Language' (1996: 392). ‘Languageu’, by 
contrast, is ‘the system of signals, both linguistic and non linguistic, created by all 
three methods of signaling’ (1996: 392), giving us a notion of 'language in its 
extended sense' (1996: 392). For his part, Harris sees the very idea of 'symbols of a 
language' as a projection of the language myth and advocates a perspective which 
'renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings 
which will “account for” a central core of linguistic behaviour irrespective of the 
situational and communicational purposes involved’ (1981: 165). He concludes: 'If 
that is equivalent to denying that there is any one identifiable system which is “the 
language” in question, so be it’ (1981: 165-166).  
 
 
3. Communication, meaning and understanding  
 
Both Clark and Harris have subjected orthodox linguistic and pragmatic conceptions 
of utterance meaning and understanding to sustained critical scrutiny. The eleven 
'dogmas of understanding' under Clark’s (1997) hammer include literal meaning, the 
mainstream (Gricean) pragmatic distinction between saying and meaning and the 
assumption that 'speakers and their addressees rely on a single monolithic lexicon' 
(Clark,1997: 580). Thus, Clark argues that the Gricean distinction between ‘saying’ 
and ‘meaning’, based on a notion of ‘literal meaning’,  assumes that ‘listeners 
determine what is said according to one set of principles or procedures, and they 
“work out” (or calculate) what is implicated according to another’ (1996: 144). 
However, as Clark shows, ‘listeners often have to calculate parts of what is said’ 
because they may be presented with ‘novel word meanings’ (e.g., ‘Never ask two 
China trips to the same party’). ‘What is said’, then, cannot be ‘well defined for every 
type of utterance’ (1996: 145). 
 
Furthermore, while his opening position on meaning in Clark (1996) is couched in the 
language of Gricean intentionality, inimical to Harris, his subsequent explorations 
lead him to weaken these commitments to intentionality. According to the ‘classical 
view’, as he puts it: ‘”What the speaker means” is a specific, objective intention of the 
speaker, and addressees are to identify that intention’ (1996: 212). However, having 
shown that communication may well go on in joint projects without such intention-
recognition matches, he consequently revises his position: ‘”what the speaker 
means” is replaced by “what the speaker is to be taken to mean” (1996: 212). He 
explains:  
 
‘speakers and hearers try to create a joint construal of what the speaker is to be 
taken to mean. Such a construal represents not what the speaker means per se – 
which can change in the very process of communicating – but what the participants 
mutually take the speaker as meaning, what they deem the speaker to mean (see 
Grice, 1982)’.  
 
Setting aside the principle of ‘joint construal’, Clark’s revision in effect brings him 
closer to Harris’s position that understanding is not a ‘recognition’ (or reception) of 
another’s meaning or intention but an independent act of semiological creativity. 
   
Clark has also criticised the ‘message model’ of communication: 
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‘The message model implies that Alan’s production, and Barbara’s reception, can be 
studied in isolation. It also implies that messages are encoded strings of symbols in 
a symbol system (say, Japanese or English), so they can be studied in isolation from 
the processes by which they are produced and received. If speaking and listening 
are participatory actions, these two implications no longer follow’ (1996: 20, Fn 6). 
 
Consequently, Clark views the ‘standard picture’ as ‘radically incomplete’ (1996: 
183), although Harris, as we shall see, goes further.  
 
Clark’s eleven dogmas are encompassed in Harris’s scorched earth treatment of the 
two components of the ‘language myth’ embodied in the orthodox language tradition 
(Harris, 1981). The first component is the idea that languages are fixed codes 
(invariant form-meaning units) and the second that linguistic communication is a 
process of ‘telementation’, referred to as ‘the principle of intersubjectivity in Taylor 
and Cameron (1987: 163), that is, a transmission, transfer, or matching of thoughts, 
ideas, symbols, meanings etc. between different minds. In combination, these two 
components supply the ideological and theoretical rationale for ‘segregationism’ 
(Clark’s ‘product tradition’/’message model’) with Saussure's conception of the 
linguistic sign and langue as the classic variant of this position. For Harris, meanings 
are not ‘semantic units established in advance by a fixed code’ but ‘values which 
arise in context out of particular communication situations. These values are 
assigned by the participants as part of the integration of activities involved’. Thus, 
communication ‘involves a constant making and re-making of meaning’ (1998a: 68). 
If we accept that signs (and, a fortiori, meanings) cannot be transmitted or conveyed 
then the only coherent alternative is to see communication between A and B in terms 
of the independent (though reciprocal) sign-making acts of A and B. In other words, 
signs are not sent and received but made on each side as the participants engage 
and integrate their activities. 
 
Consequently, for Harris, the Gricean distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is 
meant’ is a simple nonstarter because it presupposes telementation (‘the principle of 
intesubjectivity’) at the level of putative linguistic units (whether phonemes, 
morphemes, words and their meaning, syntactic structures etc). This is not to ignore 
our first-hand experience of and talk of such a distinction in everyday life (‘I know 
what he said but I’m not sure what he meant’) but it is to refuse to see the ability to 
contextualize communicative behaviour from different angles as the situation allows 
as warrant for the linguist’s notion of ‘a language’ or ‘language structure’ 
independent of communicative purpose. Harris rejects all intention-based models of 
communication (including Grice’s) as involving telementation, albeit with intentions 
rather than meanings having to match for communication to take place. As Harris 
puts it: ‘Communication is not, in the general run of human affairs, a matter in which 
those who start the ball rolling necessarily control what subsequently happens’ 
(1996: 65-66). ‘That is why’, he goes on, ‘on the one hand, the intentions of neither 
party can be taken as a sufficient basis for defining any communicational process in 
which both are engaged, but, on the other hand, taking the intentions of both as this 
basis may lead to a contradiction’ (1996: 66). Rather than pursuing a Clarkian notion 
of ‘joint construal’, which would be vulnerable to the same critique, Harris’s 
alternative to intention-based theories is ‘to begin by investigating the restrictions 
imposed on participants by the integrational relations obtaining between one 
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communication process and another’ (1996: 43). This is not to deny that people 
engage in communication with goals and intentions but to recognize that ‘neither our 
choices nor our intentions mark out the communicational space available’ to 
participants (1996: 59). The appeal to ‘restrictions’ in this sense does not licence a 
form of social determinism (‘society makes us do this or that’), but merely 
emphasises that sign-making, like all situated practices, engages the bodies and 
minds of real people and, consequently, depends on certain things being in place or 
coming into being and on things happening or having happened, many of which we 
have little or no control over.12  
 
3. The paths diverge 
 
1. Common ground 
 
The idea of 'common ground' is the cornerstone of Clark’s approach. Clark 
discusses in detail the history of this notion in linguistic and pragmatic work and 
defends the version of it which he adopts (‘CG-shared’ involving belief in a ‘shared 
basis’ for ‘propositions’, 1996: 96). He argues that coordination of action depends on 
the communicative exploitation of the participants' common ground - that 'great mass 
of knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions' which the participants 'believe they share' 
(1996: 12). As the participants interact, furthering their joint project, their common 
ground also 'advances' (1996: 43) to include everything they have experienced so far 
as well as 'what the participants presuppose to be the state of activity at the moment' 
(1996: 43). The coordinative value of communicative signals depends on their being 
rooted in common ground which may be established by the exploitation of perceptual 
salience ('that dog is coming at you') or be based on prior agreement (‘Let’s meet at 
10am’) or convention (the traffic light system). Accumulation of common ground in 
the course of activity allows participants to improve and streamline their collaboration 
via unique adaptations of communicative practice, for example, in ‘efficiency of 
expression’ (1996: 55) and ‘conceptual pacts’ and ‘lexical entrainment’ in the 
interactional emergence of new ways of talking (Brennan and Clark, 1996). 
 
In working with what the participants ‘believe they share’ (rather than in terms of 
‘what they share’), Clark is in effect attempting to avoid the difficulties which Taylor 
and Cameron (1987) identified as attached to communication models based on ‘the 
principle of intersubjectivity’. Thus, Clark recognizes that claims about conceptual 
‘common ground’ problematically imply a vantage point outside the participants’ 
interaction from which the contents of their minds can be inspected and compared. 
For example, in discussing a situation where he and his son are both examining a 
conch shell on the beach, Clark argues:   
 
‘Only an omniscient being can say: “It is common ground for the two of them that 
there is a conch shell between them”. All my son and I can do, as individuals, is 
make claims like: “I believe that it is common ground for us that there is a conch shell 
between us”. When he and I act “on the basis of our common ground”, we are in fact 
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 Haƌƌis aƌgues that ͚the iŶtegƌatioŶal ƌelatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ pƌoĐesses ĐaŶ ďe ŵapped ďǇ 
deteƌŵiŶiŶg ǁhat pƌesupposes ǁhat͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϰϯͿ. Claƌk addƌesses siŵilaƌ issues iŶ his disĐussioŶ of ͚aĐtioŶ 
laddeƌs͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϰϳffͿ ǁith his ŶotioŶ of ͚DoǁŶǁaƌd eǀideŶĐe͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϰϴͿ ĐoǀeƌiŶg soŵe of the gƌouŶd that 
Haƌƌis assigŶs to ͚pƌioƌities of pƌesuppositioŶ͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϰϯͿ. 
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acting on our individual beliefs or assumptions about what is in our common ground’ 
(1996: 96).  
 
For, as Clark notes, participants may differ (without knowing it at the time or, indeed, 
ever) on their assessments of what is common ground between them (1996: 97), 
although this may not prevent them from coordinating their actions for particular 
purposes in the present.  
 
For Harris, however, such qualifications significantly weaken the motivation for any 
cognitively-oriented or belief-based notion of common ground. As he puts it: 
 
‘The participants, A and B, are agents whose views of their own activities vis-à-vis 
each other jointly contribute to the character of their reciprocal interaction. But these 
views may nevertheless be in direct or indirect conflict within the communication 
situation to which they pertain’ (1996: 66) 
 
In other words, we cannot coordinate around knowledge ‘we believe we share’ (but 
don’t) any more than we can buy a house on the money we ‘believe we share’ (while 
actually both being broke); coordination is effected, then, by virtue of the participants’ 
contributions to the interaction, whatever beliefs may be behind them.13 And while  
Harris, too, paints a similarly dynamic picture of communicative interaction in which 
'communication creates contexts', contexts which are 'unique' and 'constantly 
developing as the communication process itself develops' (1996, 153), he rejects the 
attempt to frame the enabling conditions of communicative interaction in terms of 
participants sharing conceptual or perceptual content. As he explains: 
 
‘Integrationism ... resists the tendency that is virtually endemic in the Western 
tradition to treat identity (sameness) as a bottom-line explanation where 
communication is concerned .... For this notion that A and B have something in 
common is a form of identity statement. Any explanation of communication that 
resorts to elements allegedly “shared” or “common” as between individuals or 
contexts tacitly presupposes the validity of some external viewpoint [cf Clark’s 
‘omniscient being’, PEJ] which guarantees the underlying sameness in question' 
(1997: 287).  
 
For Harris, ‘context is not reducible to any “sharing” that can be defined in 
biomechanical, macro social or circumstantial terms. Nor is such a sharing a 
prerequisite for communication. In order that A and B be in communication with each 
other, there does not necessarily have to be any set of conditions that are equally 
binding on both, or any information to which both have equal access’ (1997: 286).14 
 
                                                          
13
 Claƌk͛s fuƌtheƌ eǆploƌatioŶ of the ŶotioŶ of ĐoŵŵoŶ gƌouŶd takes hiŵ to the ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that common 
gƌouŶd is a foƌŵ of ͚ƌefleǆiǀe self-aǁaƌeŶess͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϮϬͿ ǁhiĐh, oŶĐe ŵoƌe, seeŵs to take hiŵ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ 
ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal pƌagŵatiĐs aŶd toǁaƌds Haƌƌis foƌ ǁhoŵ ͚the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of self-communication ... shapes and 
informs our understanding of interpeƌsoŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, aŶd Ŷot ǀiĐe ǀeƌsa͛ ;Haƌƌis, ϭϵϵϲ: ϭϴϯ; see also 
Jones, 2009, 2011). 
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 Haƌƌis tƌeats the ĐoŶteǆt of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, i.e the ͚ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶal iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe͛ pƌesupposed ďǇ aŶǇ aĐt 
of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, iŶ teƌŵs of thƌee faĐtoƌs: ͚ďioŵeĐhaŶiĐal͛, ͚ŵaĐƌosoĐial͛ aŶd ͚ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶtial͛. As he puts it: 
͚The iŶtegƌatioŶ that is tǇpiĐallǇ ƌeƋuiƌed iŶ huŵaŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ depeŶds oŶ the possiďilitǇ of Đo-ordinating 
seƋueŶĐes of aĐtiǀitǇ iŶǀolǀiŶg faĐtoƌs of all thƌee kiŶds͛ ;ϭϵϵϲ: ϮϴͿ. 
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This is not to deny that tennis players A and B ‘are playing with the same ball and on 
the same court. There are not two balls and two courts, one for each player’ (1997: 
285); both players must ‘recognize that they are playing with the same ball on the 
same court and act accordingly’. However, Harris, argues ‘that recognition, 
integrationally constructed and articulated, is not something external to the playing, 
but a contextualized feature of the playing itself’ (1997: 285). By ‘recognition of the 
same x’ here, Harris appears to have in mind neither the analyst’s judgement on the 
contents of the participants’ minds, nor the participants’ own knowledge or beliefs as 
such but the de facto deployment by each participant of their communicational 
proficiencies in such a way as to successfully integrate their sending and receiving 
activities. As long as they do this, it doesn’t matter what they each believe about the 
ball and the court or about the beliefs of their opponent. On the same grounds, 
Harris emphasises the key role in communication of 'local convergence of purposes 
between the participants' which, he adds, 'is far from being the same thing as 
community of intentions or identity of understanding' (1996: 263).  
 
Harris's point, I think, is that what is communicationally fundamental is not 'common 
ground' in the sense of intersubjectivity (i.e., telementation), or belief in such, but the 
complementarity and interdependence (or reciprocity) of their sign-making acts 
which participants must establish, and which they then may hone and develop, to 
enable their mutual engagement in action. If ‘local convergence of purposes' is to be 
achieved this can only happen through a reciprocally enacted differentiation in the 
integrationally-relevant roles, experiences, skills, knowledge and beliefs of each  
participant with respect to the other. Sameness, he appears to say, cannot of itself 
explain or ground interaction; ‘sames’ cannot integrate (or coordinate). A joint action, 
then, is precisely a dynamically and situationally achieved complementarity or 
interlocking of ‘differents’. For that reason, communication generally, including 
linguistic communication, neither presupposes a shared system of signs nor occurs 
through sharing signs, meanings or beliefs; it occurs through the reciprocally 
interlocking integration of complementary creative sign-making practices; sign-
making is not the differential use or transfer of sames but the contextualized creation 
of integrated complementaries. What Clark sees as common ground and the 
accumulation of common ground is best understood, for Harris, in terms of the 
complementary integrational proficiencies of the individual participants in 
interaction.15 From that point of view, what the participants have in common is simply 
the ‘joint action’ itself, that is, the emerging result and product of their combined 
activities. This divergence over common ground penetrates to the very definitions of 
‘signal’ and ‘sign’ in Clark and Harris. While Clark posits a shared semiological basis 
for communication between A and B in joint construal of a single signal produced by 
A, Harris has two different signs in play as the result of the interlocking sign-making 
practices of each agent.16  
                                                          
15
 For a novel attempt to reconcile Clarkian common ground with the complementarity of participant roles and 
ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs, see ‘ąĐzaszek-LeoŶaƌdi, Dęďska aŶd SoĐhaŶoǁiĐz ;ϮϬϭϰͿ. 
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 At this point we might also note that Clark’s conception of common ground couched in terms of 
intentions and beliefs appears to chime with a currently very pronounced mentalist orientation in 
language research built around ‘theory of mind’ and a conception of communication as ‘mind reading’ 
(e.g., Tomasello, 2010; Enfield and Levinson, 2006). Harris, on the other hand, views all such 
approaches as telementational and traces the origins of the individual’s communicational proficiencies 
to the situated exercise and development of ‘biomechanical capacities’ (1996: 28ff) as the primary 
means of integrational engagement with the world and other people. 
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2. Languages  
 
We have noted that Clark has challenged many of the key assumptions of the 
‘standard picture’, in particular the ‘product tradition’ viewpoint and its associated 
‘message model’ of communication’. Nevertheless, Clark maintains a commitment to 
the existence of 'conventional languages like English, Dakota, Japanese or American 
Sign Language' along with 'the phonological, lexical, morphological, syntactic, and 
semantic rules of a language - its grammar' (1996: 77), that is, to what he calls 
‘languages’ in contrast with ‘languageu’. In order to square this circle, Clark attempts 
to protect and preserve the fundamental metalinguistic construct of the ‘product 
tradition’ by re-casting it in coordination terms. 'Languages like English', he argues 
(following Lewis) 'are conventional signaling systems par excellence' (1996: 75). But 
what 'coordination problem' are such conventional signals employed to solve? Clark 
explains: 
 
'Most English speakers … have contingency plans that include this pairing of 
conditionals, which I will call a signaling doublet: 
Speaker: If you intend to denote the cipher naught, you can utter the word zero. 
Addressee: If a speaker utters the word zero, he or she can be denoting the cipher 
naught' (1996: 75). 
 
Thus the word zero 'is a coordination device for a recurrent coordination problem - 
speakers wanting to denote naught and their addressees wanting to recognize this' 
(1996: 75). As Clark himself acknowledges without discomfort: 'In de Saussure's 
classic Cours de linguistique générale (1916), he called such a doublet a linguistic 
sign' (1996: 75). 
 
But I would argue that this step, far from advancing his general case for a semiology 
of coordination, stretches it beyond breaking point. Despite his avowed commitment 
to the study of language use within social activity, Clark now advances a conception 
of a conventional language as a context-independent system of self-solving 
semiological problems: in effect a word is a solution to the ‘coordination problem’ of 
how to say a word that means what we want it to mean. Furthermore, the ‘common 
ground’ required of participants is now clearly stated in terms of a speaker ‘intending 
to denote x’ and a hearer ‘wanting to recognize’ this intention, despite Clark’s 
criticisms of intention-matching noted above.  
 
In Harris’s terms, Clark’s treatment of linguistic signals involves capitulation to both 
elements of the language myth: his ‘doublets’ are elements of a fixed code (‘zero’ 
encodes ‘naught’) and communication depends on the transfer of invariant verbal 
meanings between A and B (via intention and intention recognition). Indeed, as Clark 
makes clear without any hint of discomfort, his approach is simply a terminological 
re-working of Saussure's 'circuit de parole'. 
 
But how can we explain ‘language use’, with its continuous semiological creativity 
and adaptability, by appeal to invariant verbal units and fixed code semantics? Clark 
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is aware of this issue which he attempts to address by proposing a distinction 
between ‘potential use’ and ‘actual use’ of linguistic elements (derived from Lewis’s 
distinction between ‘possible’ and ‘actual’ languages, 1969: 161ff)17:  
 
 ‘The conventions of English are hardly enough to make communication work. They 
specify only the potential uses of a word or construction – and only some of these. 
They never specify the actual uses. The doublet for zero says how the word can be 
used. It doesn’t say how it actually is used on some particular occasion. Every use of 
language raises non-conventional coordination problems, which depend for their 
solution on joint salience, solvability and sufficiency’ (1996: 77). 
 
Clark argues that actual senses of a word, including novel meanings, must be 
'derived from' or 'built around' 'a conventional meaning' of the word (1996: 77). In 
illustration, he presents the case of a woman who called directory enquiries to ask 
about toll charges (1996: 78). She was told by the operator, “I don’t know -  you’ll 
have to ask a zero”. What did the operator mean by ‘zero’ in this case?  
 
'Suppose', Clark argues, 'zero has four conventional senses – “cipher naught”, “nil”, 
“freezing temperature”, and “nonentity”'. Then: 
 
‘If the caller had selected one of the conventional senses for zero, she might have 
chosen “nonentity” (“I don’t know – you’ll have to ask a nonentity”). Yet she 
reportedly interpreted the operator as meaning “person one can reach on a 
telephone by dialing the cipher naught”. The operator used zero with a novel, non-
conventional interpretation, and the caller interpreted it on the spot. How did they 
manage? The operator created a participant coordination problem that they solved 
on the basis of solvability, sufficiency, immediacy, and joint salience’ (1996: 78). 
 
In this case, '[t]he operator’s use of zero was built around “naught”' (1996: 78). 
 
From an integrationist perspective, this is a strange, and strained, argument. There 
is an initial assumption, based on the fixed-code myth, that there is a conventional 
entity called ‘English’ which consists of determinate and denumerable units with 
determinate and denumerable meanings. In a further move, a distinction is drawn 
between convention and instance in a way which confirms the initial assumption: the 
fixed code exists as a potential to be used in various ways in real communication. In 
a sense, Clark has simply rephrased the pragmatic distinction between saying and 
meaning as a distinction between potential and actual use of words. By the same 
token, the ‘message model’ (telementation) is revived, if not for actual use in all its 
concreteness then for the transmission and matching of ‘signaling doublets’ 
underlying actual use. 
 
But, taking Clark’s example a bit further, one might prefer to say that the operator 
used 'zero' in a way that was quite conventional for the local community of San 
Francisco telephone operators in the 1980s although quite unconventional for the 
caller (what Clark calls a ‘communal lexicon’, 1997: 580). The point being that we 
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cannot find, and nor should we expect, a common set of conventions that we can 
appeal to as a basis for understanding language use. But if there is no common 
system then there is no such thing as ‘English’ as Clark appears to see it. If you use 
a word I'm not familiar with, it doesn't help to insist that this is a word of English used 
in its conventional meaning (unless you're playing Scrabble). Conversely, if I am 
familiar with the word (or can guess its meaning at that point) then it doesn't matter 
for present communicational purposes whether it is conventional or not in any wider 
social sense. It would be quite wrong, then, to attribute communicational success in 
a particular linguistic interaction to some putative general social contract concerning 
the signs in play - to the 'sign system of English' - since it is the prior communicative 
experience of particular individuals and their powers or inclination to exploit such 
experience which constitute the only relevant factors to them as participants. 
 
And so while Clark must acknowledge that communication works by actual use not 
potential use, he appears to overlook the problem of reconciling actual use with the 
notion of a 'conventional signaling system'. For, as he shows elsewhere (Brennan 
and Clark, 1996) novel actual uses of words are immediately picked up on by other 
participants and 'conventionalized' in local contexts. As Duncker argues: 
'Conventionalization is an ongoing process, and conventions, therefore, are 
inherently open-ended and in-the-(re)-making' (2012: 417). Whatever ‘English’ might 
be, then, it is changing from moment to moment in real time interaction; there simply 
is no identifiable ‘system’ that can be pinned down. As Harris puts it:  
 
‘When we come across words we do not know, words which apparently did not exist 
a few years ago, it is difficult to resist two conclusions. One is that if there are verbal 
“codes”, they cannot be fixed: on the contrary, they must be changing all the time. 
The other conclusion is that if there are such codes, different people use different 
ones, and these too change. Until yesterday, mine did not include the word moshpit: 
today it does. But if the code has the kind of instability evidenced by the sudden 
emergence of new words and meanings, what guarantee of stability is there for “old” 
words and meanings? The integrationist sees none’ (Harris, 1998a: 79). 
 
Our prior experience, as Duncker (2012) notes, may equip us with certain strong 
expectations about what our interlocutors may know and understand (as speakers of 
‘English’) but such expectations (which will inevitably differ as between participants) 
can only be met (or not) and validated (or not) by means of the exercise of the 
participants’ communicational proficiencies on a particular occasion. From this 
perspective, any continuity and stability in communicative practice (in ‘English’) as 
the participants may experience it is not the result of the use of abstract, invariant 
conventional signals, but an achievement of their own in producing behaviours 
which, for their specific purposes, are recognisable or intelligible. In Harris’s terms: 
 
‘It is this interaction which confers relevance upon the participants' past experience 
with words, and not, as orthodox linguistics would have us believe, past experience 
(that is to say, mastery of “the language”) which determines the communicational 
possibilities of their present interaction’ (Harris, 1981: 166). 
 
At least on this matter, then, Clark’s approach sits squarely within the orthodox 
linguistic tradition which ‘starts from an assumption about languages as fixed codes 
already common to a linguistic community’ (1998a: 125). Harris advances a different 
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point of departure, namely ‘recognition of the individuality of linguistic experience’ 
(1998a: 125). He goes on:  
 
‘If linguistic experience inevitably differs from one individual to another, what is the 
relationship between A’s “language”, B’s “language” and that communal “language” 
which (let us suppose) A and B both regard themselves (and each other) as 
speaking?’ (1998a: 125).  
 
To which he answers: ‘this will vary according to the way in which, on particular 
occasions, A and/or B contextualize their own discourse in relation to an abstraction 
which they posit as a social norm’ (1998a: 125).  
 
Furthermore, to claim that the caller’s interpretation of the operator’s ‘zero’ was ‘built 
around a conventional use’ is stretching it a bit. Perhaps we can concede that the 
woman in question heard (rightly or wrongly from the operator’s perspective) what 
she took to be a familiar word (‘zero’) in trying to make out what the operator was 
saying. But such a process cannot bear the weight of linguistic orthodoxy that Clark 
wants to load onto it. A striking and rather entertaining piece of verbal sleight of hand 
might illustrate the point. A ‘legal problem’ is presented to willing and unsuspecting 
participants along the following lines:  
 
‘If a plane crashed on the border between the U.S. and Canada in which country 
would you bury the survivors?’18  
(For readers who are unfamiliar with the case I leave the penny to drop...). 
 
As my own personal experience can attest, many participants show a keenness to 
engage helpfully with the problem:  
 
‘If a plane crashed along the Canadian/US border, neither country would bare 
(sic) a responsibility to bury any survivors; though, both countries as while as the 
airline owning the downed plane would likely offer assistance to victims and their 
families in any number of ways- the minimum being grief counseling.’   
 
‘Silly question. You would send them to their home towns. And a border is a line. 
You would be on one side or the other.’ 
 
‘let them lay there, and whatever government gets tired of the stink first will do 
the deed.’  
 
The interesting question for the Clarkian would be: which one of the ‘conventional’ 
meanings of the word survivor are these responses ‘built around’? One might argue 
that, in their eagerness to contribute to what they take at face value to be the 
relevant ‘joint project’, participants have not so much ‘built around’ a conventional 
meaning but demolished it ... Can the actual use of survivor in this sense (‘one who 
doesn’t survive’) be explained by the potential use of the word (‘one who survives’)? 
Although this verbal trick may possibly appear to be an anomaly in terms of 
language use as Clark understands it, for Harris it would demonstrate the co-
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 The question, and the helpful responses, are taken from 
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operative exercise of creative communicational intelligence at work in all linguistic 
interaction. As he argues, ‘the general thesis that linguistic communication requires 
agreement in definitions and in judgements may be seriously misleading’ (1988: 
120). A ‘preferable point of departure for any general enquiry into language’, he goes 
on, may be ‘that linguistic communication is the reaching of agreement by means of 
verbal signs in particular interactional episodes’ (1988: 120). When people are co-
operating, there is ‘no prior set of rules they have to conform to ... They are free to 
use verbal signs in any way which will further that co-operation and get the job done’ 
(1988: 119-120). In other words, if we assume that the ‘conventional meaning’ of 
survivor (‘one who survives’) in ‘English’ is a common point of departure for the 
participants then we will never understand these responses. 
 
Ultimately, then, Clark’s assumptions about languages as ‘conventional signaling 
systems’ lead him to reproduce the ‘standard picture’ which he is otherwise so 
critical of, as we see so clearly here:  
 
‘It is impossible for Alan and Barbara to coordinate meaning and understanding 
without reference to their common ground. When Alan says, “Did you see my dog 
run by here?” Barbara is to consult the meanings of the words did, you, see, etc., 
and their composition in English sentence constructions. These meanings and 
constructions are part of Alan and Barbara’s common ground because Alan and 
Barbara are both members of the community of English speakers’ (Clark, 1996: 13). 
 
Or here:  
 
‘For you to understand “She’s going outside,” we must each take as common ground 
the linguistic conventions on which this utterance is based  - the meanings of she, 
go, and outside, the syntax of intransitive verbs, the semantics of progressive aspect’ 
(1996: 114).  
 
What Clark cannot see is that this conventional descriptive metalanguage 
presupposes the ‘omniscient’ perspective (intersubjectivity) on common ground to 
which he drew critical attention. Of course, such a perspective (reflecting specific 
cultural traditions and ideologies) is inscribed in the very practice of transcription of 
utterances and other communicative acts, adopted uncritically by Clark, whereby   
a single, determinate graphic artefact is offered as a representation of (or analysis 
of) the common linguistic knowledge, behaviour or experience of speaker and 
listener (indeed, of all ‘English speakers’). But this is like offering the written score of 
an orchestral work as a representation of the ‘shared’ musical experience of 
instrumental performers and listeners.  
 
Clarkian theorists might object that they at least are trying to link the particular 
interaction under examination with the broader linguistic and social context. As Clark 
puts it, 'the rules of a language … describe regularities of behavior - what English 
speakers regularly do, and expect others to do, to achieve part of what they intend to 
do in using sounds, words, constructions, and sentences for communication' (1996: 
77). To which Harrisians may in turn respond by arguing that it is impossible to do 
justice either to the social or the personal significance of a communicative episode 
by assuming in advance that the communicating agents are 'doing what English 
speakers regularly do', in itself a highly loaded (socially, culturally, and ethnically) 
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way of speaking. Harris addresses this issue directly in his discussion of a case of 
misunderstanding in which a female pupil took her teacher's utterance 'sit here for 
the present' to mean ‘sit here to receive a present’ rather than ‘sit here for now'. 
Harris comments: 
 
 'Given prevalent patterns of behaviour in British schools, the intended interpretation 
of the words “sit there for the present” as an instruction to the addressee to sit in a 
certain place for the time being may be seen as considerably more probable than the 
alternative. But this is a probability that depends on looking at communicational 
patterns over the linguistic community as a whole; for it is only at that level that it 
becomes meaningful to assign weightings to different interpretations on the basis of 
generally relevant contextual factors. In any individual instance, however, the 
general relevance of the contextual factors in question may easily be overridden by 
some special circumstance. In language as in all else, probabilities are only 
probabilities, and no more. What makes no sense whatever is to introduce concepts 
derived from an analysis of linguistic-behaviour-in-the-mass into the explanation of 
an individual misunderstanding, where it is the viewpoint of the participants that 
alone determines the outcome' (1998c: 42).19 
 
From Harris's perspective, it is significant that Clark must acknowledge that  
conventional signals 'require non-conventional coordination for their interpretation' 
(1996: 78), as in the case of ‘zero’ above. What this means is that the creation of 
signals (i.e., ‘non-conventional coordination’) must be the primary and fundamental 
communicative process, one taking place both in the absence of any 'conventional 
coordination' (as with 'material signals') and as the enabling process for the use of 
conventional (familiar) signs. This is exactly the point which Harris argues in his own 
discussion of the role of consensus and convention in communication: 
 
'a communicational code or rule, however it is laid down, can be neither followed nor 
infringed except through some integrated sequence(s) of activities by the participants 
involved. It is in this sense that there is no communication without integration' (1996: 
258).  
 
In fact, as Harris shows, Clark’s attempt to provide a ‘coordination’ underpinning for 
his segregationist treatment of ‘conventional language’ falls into a long tradition of 
segregationist ‘fixed code’ theorising in linguistics: ‘The segregationist mistake as 
regards language is one which consists in assuming language to be – or to be based 
on – a vast network of regulative tradition’ (1996: 251).20 However, Harris argues, the 
                                                          
19
 Whetheƌ Haƌƌis͛s distiŶĐtioŶ heƌe ďetǁeeŶ ͚liŶguistiĐ-behaviour-in-the-ŵass͛ aŶd a paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe 
aĐt ;oƌ the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚ŵaĐƌosoĐial pƌofiĐieŶĐǇ͛ aŶd ͚ŵaĐƌosoĐial ĐoŶfoƌŵitǇ͛, ϭϵϵϲ: ϮϵͿ is Đoŵpatiďle 
ǁith the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚fiƌst-oƌdeƌ laŶguagiŶg͛ aŶd ͚seĐoŶd-ordeƌ laŶguage patteƌŶs͛ iŶ Thiďault͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ 
eǆpositioŶ of the ͚distƌiďuted laŶguage͛ ǀieǁ is a ƋuestioŶ I ǁill leaǀe foƌ suďseƋueŶt eǆploƌatioŶ. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, 
oŶe ŵight ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhetheƌ Thiďault͛s appliĐatioŶ of the ŵetaliŶguistiĐ fƌaŵeǁoƌk of HallidaǇaŶ SǇstemic 
Functional Grammar to particular interactions is not simply a way in which a segregationist construct is re-
presented and re-ŵodelled iŶ teƌŵs of ͚Ŷoƌŵatiǀe Đultuƌal patteƌŶs͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϮϯϲͿ. ;OŶ liŶguistiĐ ƌegulaƌities aŶd 
normativity see Taylor, 1997; Jones, 2007). 
20
 Thiďault͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚seĐoŶd-oƌdeƌ͛ laŶguage ǁould appeaƌ to ďe siŵilaƌlǇ ǀulŶeƌaďle to Haƌƌis͛s ĐƌitiƋue: 
͚SeĐoŶd-order language patterns are the emergent historical-cultural products of the conventionalized 
solutions devised by collectivities of interacting agents to the numerous problems of coordination that they 
aƌe Đalled upoŶ to solǀe iŶ the ŵaŶǇ diffeƌeŶt kiŶds of soĐial aĐtiǀities  ǁith ǁhiĐh laŶguage is iŶtegƌated͛ 
(Thibault, 2011: 219). 
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scope of such highly regulated practices is limited: ‘Large areas of human thought 
and action are simply beyond the scope of regulative practice, and always will be’ 
(1996: 254). And if ‘[t]here is no practical possibility of anchoring all linguistic usage 
to specific regulative practices’ (1996: 253) then the only way to reconcile the notion 
of ‘a language’ with a ‘coordination’ theory of language use is, as we have seen in 
Clark, to partition linguistic communication into ‘languages’ and ‘languageu’ with the 
former conceived, as in the ‘product tradition’, as a decontextualised and idealized 
semiological circularity.  
 
 
4. Balance sheet: common ground or conflicting agendas? 
 
In comparing Clark’s coordination approach with Harris’s integrationism, we have 
noted a partial convergence of purpose in prioritising the knowledge, skills and 
experiences involved in actual instances of communication over the metalinguistic 
abstractions and methods of linguistic orthodoxy. Towards this end, both scholars 
have each developed quite independently a substantial body of work devoted to the 
exploration of contextualized meaning-making in which we find many specific points 
of compatibility or agreement. The terms ‘coordination’ and ‘integration’ in 
themselves, if we take them as having to do with the communicational processes by 
which people connect and concert their behaviours towards a particular outcome, 
are pretty much interchangeable.  
 
At the same time, however, there are radical differences on fundamental issues of 
communicational philosophy between Clark and Harris which ultimately render their 
respective intellectual projects incompatible. These differences, as we have seen, 
are evident in their respective attitudes towards ‘common ground’ and towards the  
orthodox notion of conventional languages.   
 
From Harris’s perspective, Clark’s approach is a form of what he calls ‘weak 
segregationalism’ (1996: 147) in that it accepts the basic assumptions and methods 
of linguistic orthodoxy while adding additional principles to account for real  
communication in context. One way to do this, as in Clark, is to posit the abstract 
and invariant linguistic system (‘langue’) as a ‘potential’ which is to be ‘used’ in actual 
utterances, an approach Harris refers to as a ‘fixed-code-plus semantics’ (1998a: 
80). Their conflicting positions on this are quite evident in the titles of two of their 
most important works: Using Language (Clark, 1996) and The Language Makers 
(Harris, 1980). For Harris, Clark’s model of 'language use' fits into a long-established 
instrumental tradition, which he calls ‘a naïve and widespread way of thinking of 
signs as tools or instruments’ (1996; 32): ‘signs are ... conceptualized as being, like 
the chopper and the mower, instruments already in existence “before” the activity 
they make possible’ (1996: 32). In this tradition, it ‘is taken for granted that the sign is 
one thing and how people use it or respond to it is another’ (1996: 33). Harris’s 
integrational approach, on the other hand, rejects the instrumental view:  
 
‘It calls in question the coherence of supposing that signs can exist independently of 
their users. It also questions whether mere familiarity with a common set of signs can 
in any case explain what A and B have to do in order to communicate. For the 
integrationist, there is no sign without a context, and contexts are not given in 
19 
 
advance. Signs, in short, are not waiting to be “used”: they are created in and by the 
act of communication’ (1996: 6-7). 
 
Underlying what might appear to be technical disputes over linguistic description, 
however, are deeper and more far-reaching issues of communicational philosophy.  
For Harris, and, as we have seen, for Clark to some extent, the long-enduring 
segregationalist approach to language is based on a reification and de-humanising 
of communicative practice. As particular utterances are seen as mere tokens of 
(‘uses of’) pre-existing sentence types, so particular individuals become mere 
mouthpieces for ‘society’; the very ability of individuals to communicate with one 
another is explained in terms of the formal and semantic properties of a pre-
established system of signs. In contrast, integrationism allows us to see that 
collective actions and society-wide patterns of activity do not presuppose a common 
language, shared knowledge or even common values, but are produced in and 
through the constantly renewed achievement of communicative complementarity and 
interdependence between flesh-and-blood individuals whose respective purposes 
have locally converged (whether consensually or by coercion). On this perspective, 
the apparent regularity and predictability of linguistic behaviour has nothing to do 
with underlying abstract systems, but has its source in ‘the location of the voluntary 
acts of individual linguistic agents within the coercive moral context of everyday life’ 
(Taylor, 1997: 156).  
 
Thus, Harris’s integrationist programme is an invitation to work out, 
uncompromisingly, the implications of taking real people, warts and all, as the agents 
of communication. Clark goes part of the way with Harris but stops short at that 
crucial point where linguistic orthodoxy is most threatened, where the weight of 
linguistic tradition bears down most heavily. The outcome, from Harris’s perspective, 
is an awkward and theoretically inconsistent compromise which is able to develop 
important insights into some aspects of real time communicative interaction but falls 
back on the product tradition, with its atemporal units and structures, when it comes 
to language use.  
Such is not the integrationist way. While acknowledging the utility, in certain 
contexts, of traditional grammatical metalanguage as well as of written transcription, 
integrationists would insist on taking such practices not as based on – still less 
revealing – supposed intersubjective units of linguistic communication, but as 
particular communicative practices in themselves in which aspects of first order 
linguistic behaviour are re-contextualized in line with particular theoretical or 
professional goals. Such methodological orientations have social and political import  
and consequences of their own, as Harris has continually emphasised. Indeed, it is 
rather ironic that linguists deploy tools from linguistics in their critical discussions of 
social and political ideology but rarely examine the ideological assumptions behind 
the linguistic frameworks deployed.21  
In rescuing language from the clutches of reification and according it its rightful place 
as a creative human power, integrationism thereby also restores the political, ethical 
and aesthetic charge of languaging: if we are the makers of language, rather than 
mere users of some conventional system come from who knows where, then we are 
                                                          
21
 For further discussion of the social and political implications of integrationism, see Jones and Collins (2006),  
Jones (2007).  
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responsible and, at least in principle, accountable for what we make; we are duty 
bound to critically challenge the ‘coercive moral context of everyday life’ for its 
curtailment of communicative potential as well as its effects on our self-
understanding and to question the rationale and the benefits of those local 
convergences of purpose to which we are subject and to which we contribute. 
Ultimately, perhaps, Roy Harris’s most important contribution was to encourage us to 
see the damage we inflict on ourselves, and, therefore, on our vision of possible 
human futures, by obscuring or denying the humanity of language. 
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